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Abstract 
“Counterterrorism in Afghanistan: Aligning Resources and Goals” 
 
After US Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] and Special Operations Forces [SOF] 
counterterrorism [CT] operations routed al Qaeda and the Taliban regime, planning for the next 
phase was underway. It was determined that security and stability operations or 
counterinsurgency [COIN] operations would be necessary to stabilize the country. Soon after 
transitioning from CT to COIN operations, COIN operations stalled. Several factors have played 
a part in the unsuccessful attempts at COIN. First, the Global War on Terror [GWOT] campaign 
was designed to address a narrow set of goals including destroying, dismantling, and disrupting 
al Qaeda and its affiliates. Second, US leaders have consistently undermanned the effort with a 
light military footprint. Next, the various forces continuing CT operations have remained 
uncoordinated from Joint Forces pursuing the COIN operation. Presently, US financial and 
political support for the conflict is rapidly declining. With US leaders already beginning troop 
withdrawals, it is imperative that the US adjust its strategy. Narrowing the focus back to a CT 
campaign will maximize the available resources and cut back on associated costs. Finally, a CT 
strategy will keep terror networks off balance, buying time to allow US forces to build Afghan 
security forces necessary for long-term stability. 
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Section 1. 
1.1 Acronyms 
 
AO   Area of Operations 
AOR   Area of Responsibility 
C2   Command and Control 
CIA   Central Intelligence Agency 
CINC   Commander in Chief (see GCC) 
CJCS   Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
CJSOTF  Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force 
COIN   Counterinsurgency 
CSAR   Combat Search and Rescue 
CT   Counterterrorism 
DA   Direct Action 
DOD    Department of Defense 
FOB   Forward Operating Base 
GCC   Geographic Combatant Commander    
GPF   General Purpose Forces  
GWOT  Global War on Terror 
HVT   High Value Target 
ISAF   International Security Assistance Force 
JCS   Joint Chiefs of Staff 
JP   Joint Publication 
JSOA   Joint Special Operations Agency 
JSOC   Joint Special Operations Command 
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JTF   Joint Task Force 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NCA   National Command Authority 
ODA   Operational Detachment Alpha 
OSS   Office of Strategic Services 
QDR   Quadrennial Defense Review 
RC   Regional Command 
SEAL   Sea, Air, and Land (Naval Special Operation Forces) 
SECDEF  Secretary of Defense 
SF   US Army Special Forces 
SFOD-D  Special Forces Operational Detachment Delta 
SOF   Special Operations Forces 
SOTF   Special Operations Task Force 
SR   Special Reconnaissance 
UAV   Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UCP   Unified Command Plan 
UN   United Nations 
USC   United States Code 
USCENTCOM US Central Command 
USSOCOM  US Special Operations Command 
UW   Unconventional Warfare 
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1.2 Introduction  
The terrorist attacks on 9/11 were the third in a series perpetrated by al Qaeda against the 
US. As far back as 1998, al Qaeda was linked to the US embassy truck bombings at Nairobi, 
Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. In 2000, the naval destroyer USS Cole was bombed while 
refueling off the coast of Yemen. During these attacks, the US national command authorities 
[NCA] were reviewing plans to counter al Qaeda. Certain plans involved classified SOF. These 
plans were, however, never put into action for several reasons. Initially the Pentagon was 
reluctant to participate citing the definitions of terrorism as criminal acts that did not warrant a 
military operation. Short of a declaration of war, a military CT response was unlikely. 
After the al Qaeda attacks on 9/11, US leaders decided they must update the policy of 
reacting and dealing with acts of terrorism against the United States. The new US policy became 
known as the “Global War on Terror” [GWOT] and set out to preempt terrorist threats against 
US interests. The key feature of this policy advanced that acts of terrorism were no longer a 
criminal matter. Instead, acts of terror towards the US would be considered acts of war and 
would involve a military response. When asked to brief US leaders with the plan of attack in 
Afghanistan US military leaders had no immediate plans prepared. The CIA responded with a 
plan to introduce paramilitary forces and create a conduit through which US SOF could 
participate.  
The CIA’s plan to launch attacks against the Taliban and al Qaeda was put into action 
with the assistance of US SOF. As knowledge about al Qaeda grew, US leaders determined that 
the campaign would focus on special operations designed to impact the unconventional enemy 
on his own terms. Unconventional warfare [UW] is one type of special operation involved in low 
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intensity or guerilla conflicts. Special operations typically involve sending small groups of (SOF) 
operators into enemy territory to engage in one of the following types of operations: direct 
action, strategic/special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, 
counterterrorism, psychological operations, civil affairs, and humanitarian assistance. In the case 
of Afghanistan, small groups of US CIA and SOF were the first to enter the country. These 
teams assembled groups of indigenous militia who were hostile to al Qaeda and the Taliban. The 
GWOT began in the fall of 2001, when US forces and their indigenous militias launched assaults 
on al Qaeda and the Taliban. The opening phase of the GWOT quickly saw the routing of al 
Qaeda and Taliban forces, however much of the leadership of both al Qaeda and Taliban were 
able to escape.  
Later, a clearly upset Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld complained to US military 
leaders about their lack of preparedness. Secretary Rumsfeld then began to prepare for the next 
phase of the wider GWOT campaign. The Pentagon believed that in order to defeat al Qaeda, 
SOF would need to play a major role in upcoming operations. US Special Operations Command 
[USSOCOM] was instructed to begin preparations to become the lead organization in planning 
CT operations in the GWOT. Under the 2004 Unified Command Plan [UCP], USSOCOM was 
given new and increased authority to plan and synchronize SOF counterterrorism [CT] efforts 
globally. USSOCOM was now able to set protocol for all Geographic Combatant Commanders 
[GCC] including US Central Command [USCENTCOM], whose area of responsibility included 
Afghanistan.  
By spring of 2002, the US offensive against the Taliban and al Qaeda were nearly 
complete. US and NATO officials began shifting operational strategy towards security and 
stability operations. The security and stability operations or counterinsurgency [COIN], were 
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directed at winning the population over to the Afghan national government. To facilitate the 
COIN mission, greater numbers of conventional troops were deployed to Afghanistan. The US 
COIN strategy as implemented in Afghanistan varies from traditional COIN doctrine. One 
example was the light military footprint which used a minimal number of US and coalition 
troops far below that specified for COIN doctrine.  
During the Bush administration, special operations targeting members of al Qaeda and 
the Taliban were taking a toll on leaders and mid-level individuals. Approval of JSOC CT 
missions was only necessary from the USCENTCOM commander. These operations were often 
uncoordinated and in some instances, experienced questionable results. There were several times 
when these CT missions mistakenly killed or wounded civilians. These killings created friction 
between the US and NATO forces and the Afghans. It was quickly becoming clear that despite 
the successes, CT operations were having negative impacts on the COIN campaign.  
The key part of the CT campaign, involved using highly classified units within 
USSOCOM known as Joint Special Operations Command [JSOC]. Members of JSOC are 
trained to conduct classified missions vital to national security and hostage rescue. Due to the 
high risk nature of these missions, JSOC units are considered to be the elite of SOF and include 
the Navy’s SEAL Team 6, and the Army’s Special Forces Delta squadrons or “Delta Force.” 
Under the national command authorities [NCA], JSOC began to develop a CT strategy of 
targeting, tracking, then capturing or killing individual members of al Qaeda and the Taliban. 
Some of these operations have created problems for US and NATO International Security 
Assistance Forces [ISAF] as well as Afghan army forces. The problems arise due to JSOC’s 
ability to operate outside the command and control of US-ISAF regional (battle space) 
commands [RC]. JSOC’s secretive CT campaign poses several risks for coalition forces pursuing 
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COIN operations, and ultimately goes directly against established Joint Forces doctrine. In the 
end, JSOC is conducting its own operations essentially out of phase with coalition operations. 
The concept for Joint Forces doctrine came after several highly controversial special 
operations experienced avoidable failures during the 1980’s. As part of the 1987 Goldwater-
Nichols Department of Defense Reformation Act [Goldwater-Nichols] Joint Forces doctrine 
became the foundation of US military operations. Goldwater-Nichols was designed to break the 
insular perspective held by the US military services. The act attempted to provide a simplified 
chain of command the ability to utilize the full spectrum of US military assets effectively. The 
success of Goldwater-Nichols has, however, remained controversial over the past quarter-
century.  
In late 2009, US troops were drawing down in Iraq and preparing to redeploy to assist 
with operations in Afghanistan. The Pentagon initiated a change of command in Afghanistan and 
US Army Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal was appointed to command US forces in 
Afghanistan. LTG. McChrystal had established a reputation as the commander of JSOC during 
the Iraq war. LTG. McChrystal’s CT operations were responsible for killing many members of al 
Qaeda in Iraq including Abu Musab al Zarqawi in 2006. The Obama administration asked LTG. 
McChrystal to review the situation in Afghanistan and identify what was needed to succeed. 
LTG. McChrystal acknowledged that a revised COIN strategy would work but that additional 
troops would be necessary to carry it out.  
Interestingly, despite the promotion of renewed COIN efforts, CT operations were in fact 
stepped up to some of their highest rates of the campaign. This scenario has left some scholars 
asking whether it is possible to wage simultaneous COIN and CT campaigns without the two 
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canceling the effects of the other. This research will address in detail the problems the US-
NATO coalition has faced while attempting its COIN strategy. It is clear that the current US-
ISAF coalition’s COIN strategy has not succeeded. Pursuit of a CT strategy would better serve 
US interests in two forms. First, a CT strategy would specify a clear set of goals. Clarifying goals 
would improve coordination of Joint Forces and orient all resources towards these goals. Second, 
the US continues to under resource the COIN mission. A CT strategy would allow US leaders to 
capitalize on the resources available. Ultimately, the resources in Afghanistan must be aligned 
with a coherent military strategy that can succeed. 
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Section 2. 
2.1 Thesis Statement 
It is the premise of this thesis that continuing the present COIN strategy will not succeed 
in stabilizing Afghanistan. The campaign in Afghanistan must return to a CT focused operation. 
It is proposed that the US scale back its state building COIN operations and accelerate the 
building of capable Afghan security forces. Though this is not the optimal long term strategy for 
Afghanistan, a CT policy would be more likely to solve several current problems. A CT policy 
would assist in orienting coalition forces around a clear goal, coordinate Joint Forces, and utilize 
the available resources. The initial design of the GWOT supported a concise set of goals: to 
dismantle, disrupt, and destroy the al Qaeda terror network and its affiliates in Afghanistan. The 
GWOT also sought to make Afghanistan inhospitable as a sanctuary to al Qaeda. The US later 
attempted to expand the campaign of state building and counterinsurgency [COIN]. In spite of 
this expanded venture, it was never fully resourced by US leaders who instead kept troop 
numbers to a minimum. US military leaders established a new version of COIN that supported 
the ongoing CT operations. This version of COIN has experienced several setbacks and is 
unlikely to succeed in its ambitions. Currently, the US has become focused on a poor economy 
and support for a costly war has declined. Continuing the present undermanned COIN operation 
offers little hope for a secure future for Afghanistan. 
 
2.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to serve two purposes. First, this study will add to the debate 
campaign strategy in Afghanistan. Second, it hopes to add to the scholarly discussion of US 
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military policy in current and future conflicts. This study sets out to reassess the US strategy of 
implementing simultaneous COIN and CT operations. Joint warfare involving SOF and GPF in 
the past has experienced several problems. Recently, many scholars on military policy in 
Afghanistan have discussed matching the military ends and means. With the ongoing disconnect 
between military resources and goals in Afghanistan, the discussion of strategy in Afghanistan 
will likely continue.  
 
2.3 Methodology 
This thesis looks at the US GWOT strategy which began in Afghanistan following the 
September 11, 2001 attacks. Several factors have affected the war in Afghanistan during the past 
ten years. In 2009 President Obama reviewed and refocused on the military strategy in 
Afghanistan to determine what was necessary for success. The result of this assessment was a 
new campaign that was widely claimed to be COIN. This new campaign has, however, proven to 
diverge from traditional COIN doctrine and instead involved an increased emphasis on CT. The 
increased use of the classified Joint Special Operations Command [JSOC] in CT operations has 
sparked much debate. The fact that these specific SOF units are able to operate outside the 
authority of coalition forces in theater has created several problems. The largest problem is an 
uncoordinated CT strategy within the larger COIN campaign. This study will discuss the 
problems that arise when JSOC conducts uncoordinated operations in and around the confined 
battle spaces of Afghanistan.  
 This study will follow a qualitative methodology in order to thoroughly analyze and 
assess materials relating to the GWOT throughout its ten year development in Afghanistan. The 
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primary resources used include several published accounts of the war in Afghanistan. The 
publications will include quarterly political and military journals, texts, and scholarly research 
relative to the topic outlined above. Items of specific interest include resources describing the 
recent history of US military doctrine, special operations forces, unconventional warfare, and the 
GWOT. These resources will establish a full understanding of the development of US military 
doctrine as the threat of terrorism began to take shape. A great deal of material has been 
published since the 9/11 attacks. Among the publications, several have outlined the dramatic 
shift in US policy dealing with terrorism and the rise of the GWOT. The published resources are 
supplemented with interviews of three US Army Special Forces veterans of the GWOT.  
The interviews with three veteran Army Special Forces members provide greater detail 
and insight into the military perspective from the battlefield. The three individuals interviewed 
are all members of US Army Special Forces having served tours of duty in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
These Special Forces soldiers bring firsthand knowledge of military strategy as it unfolded on the 
battlefield in Afghanistan. The ability to conduct interviews with experienced combat veterans 
brings another dimension and perspective difficult to gain solely from published materials. The 
secretive nature of ongoing JSOC special operations generally makes conducting research 
difficult. What little published material on special operations is available is typically greatly 
redacted. The ability to question members of SOF on their experience and perspective provides 
greater insight typically absent in published resources. The fact that the author was unable to 
interview a greater number of US SOF with experience in the GWOT is worth noting. Certain 
factors relating to these interviews however hold particular interest. First, the US Special Forces 
soldiers interviewed had conducted tours of duty at different times and under considerably 
different circumstances, such as command structures. Despite these differences, the answers 
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provided in the interviews produced responses with a similarity that may suggest more 
interviews could produce similar responses. Nevertheless, this study cannot produce conclusions 
of any quantitative value from the limited interviews obtained. Therefore these interviews will 
seek to add a professional perspective on the topic at hand only. 
The questions asked during the interviews initially dealt with command and control [C2] 
of US SOF within Afghanistan and how they interacted with conventional forces commanders. 
The different types of SOF and their missions in Afghanistan can easily confuse many readers, 
and therefore the need to clearly delineate the two became apparent. The SOF in the JSOC units 
often carry out operations and actions which are unacknowledged by the US government. This 
clandestine activity has led to these SOF, and their operations, being frequently referred to as 
“black” SOF. Acknowledged SOF and operations are therefore often called “white” SOF, which 
are typically involved with more COIN related operations. As the differences between JSOC and 
white SOF became clear, the next set of interview questions were designed to probe further. The 
second interview looked into the relationships held between JSOC, white SOF, and the command 
elements present in the areas of operation within Afghanistan. This interview also addressed any 
conditions which were present that created friction between the various forces conducting mainly 
CT or COIN operations. The full question sets asked during each interview are available in 
appendix II of this study. 
Considerable efforts have been implemented in an effort to reduce any perceived biases 
associated with those interviewed as well as those from the author. First, a wide ranging list of 
media outlets and publications have been used to provide a broad assessment of the topic. The 
examination of these accounts will allow the development of a “mosaic” to be presented. This 
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mosaic will then be compiled into a concise format suitable to address the research questions at 
hand.  
 
2.4 Limitations 
The greatest limitation on this study is the inaccessibility of materials that involve SOF 
and their activities due to secret classifications. Published materials about SOF operations in the 
media usually contain highly redacted or limited information regarding the event or activity. 
Timely information on SOF is difficult to come in contact with. When material is published in 
text, there is a lag time between the event and publication, whereby the information, tactics, or 
activities may be outdated. The standard of operational secrecy among SOF, maintains that very 
little information about many activities is ever published. 
Another limit of this study is the assurance of unbiased opinions and sources. Attempting 
to overcome this particular bias is inherent in any qualitative study and should be addressed. 
Membership in the military creates a culture that can carry an insular perspective. This 
perspective may create an “us and them” point of view concerning non-military associates and 
researchers. It must also be taken into account that the perspectives from those who are in the 
military and published material may present a “pro-military” description of events.  
Some citations in this study represent the views of members of the military and therefore 
may imply a narrowed or biased perspective. These views represent expertise in special 
operations and are imperative to an informed perspective on the topic and this study. Biases are 
ubiquitous in any media or resource and must be overcome through informed and credible 
research methods.  
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Section 3. 
3.1 Literature Review 
The literature review will begin by providing background information on US SOF. The 
second section will address US defense reformation and the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense 
Reorganization Act. The most notable attributes of the defense reformation include its impact on 
civil-military relations and modern Joint Forces doctrine. Next, the 1987 restructuring of US 
SOF under USSOCOM will be discussed. Fourth, the examination looks at the challenges faced 
by US leaders during previous attempts to use CT operations against terrorist networks. Finally, 
the GWOT strategic vision will be examined including, USSOCOM’s greater authority and how 
it affected the campaign. The literature survey will be followed by a conclusions section.  
The events on September 11th, 2001 resulted in a shift in US policy with regard to how it 
would deal with terrorist organizations and regimes that supported them. However, what has 
transpired over the course of the GWOT leaves several questions about the strategy and end 
goals. The GWOT campaign in Afghanistan has experienced several setbacks some of which 
continue today. The campaign has been torn between the two strategies of counterterrorism [CT] 
and counterinsurgency [COIN]. CT relies mainly on kinetic or Direct Action [DA] operations. 
DA missions target members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or other anti-coalition forces and then 
succeed in either capturing or killing them. COIN on the other hand is sets out to support the 
local population and establish support for the central Afghan government.  
Due to the unconventional nature of the enemy the US faced, White House leaders 
developed a strategy focused on clandestine operations and unconventional warfare [UW]. To 
pursue this strategy, US leaders turned to the experts in unconventional warfare, the CIA and US 
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Special Operations Forces [SOF]. The GWOT began with the deployment of CIA paramilitaries 
supporting US SOF to destroy, dismantle, and disrupt the Al Qaeda terror network and its 
sponsors in Afghanistan.  
Initial operations in the GWOT were CT focused and involved killing scores of al-Qaeda 
and Taliban members. As the GWOT continued to unfold, the National Command Authorities 
continued to develop the roles for the relevant geographic combatant commands [GCC] in 
Afghanistan. Primarily, this included US Central Command [USCENTCOM], whose area of 
responsibility [AOR] included Afghanistan and US Special Operations Command [USSOCOM]. 
USSOCOM would be in charge of the unconventional war against al Qaeda which included 
developing and synchronizing global CT operations. Synchronizing global CT operations 
included Afghanistan which encroached into USCENTCOM’s AOR. USCENTCOM and 
coalition general purpose forces [GPF] were entering the theater of operations to conduct 
security and stability operations also referred to as COIN. The COIN mission was to decrease the 
insurgency and build support for the Afghan central government.  
However, the GWOT campaign was never designed or equipped to conduct COIN 
operations and remains so today. Several factors both realized and unrealized, have negated a 
successful COIN campaign. First, placing USSOCOM in a supported role alongside 
USCENTCOM created several problems with Joint Forces coordination. Joint Forces doctrine 
goes back to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols act, which gave the GCC commander ultimate 
command and control [C2] over all military forces within his AOR. However, a premiere CT 
unit within USSOCOM was able to operate outside of USCENTCOM’s subordinate command 
structure, a relationship that continues today (See Appendix I, Figure 4.). Second, ongoing civil-
military struggles have impacted strategy and how the US responds to unconventional threats. 
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Next, properly equipping the military to achieve policy goals has never been appropriately 
addressed during the GWOT. Despite a widely stated desire to rebuild a stable Afghan state, the 
means have never been provided to accomplish this mission. Despite a small degree of success, 
the long-term COIN GWOT policy has lost momentum and run out of time.  
 
3.2 US Special Operations Forces 
Early US Special Operations Forces [SOF] were organized during World War II as part 
of the Office of Strategic Services [OSS]. Following the lead of the British, the US assembled 
small groups of men to infiltrate behind German lines in Europe to engage in sabotage and 
unconventional warfare. Later these groups were deactivated because the US military saw no 
immediate or future need for clandestine operations (Marquis, 1997, pp. 9-11). The 1960s saw 
the Soviet Union establishing proxy forces around the globe to expand its political influence. The 
incidents in Cuba, including the Bay of Pigs and ballistic missile crisis, left President Kennedy 
concerned with the US military’s capability to conduct low-intensity operations. President 
Kennedy began developing a new “flexible response doctrine” which focused on the US ability 
to engage in operations short of “all out war.” (Marquis, 1997, p. 13) This new policy directed 
the US military to quickly expand its unconventional forces in order to engage the Soviet proxy 
nations and “liberate” them from communist influence (Ibid.).  
In a 1961 defense budget proposal to Congress, President Kennedy called for expanding 
the US Army Special Forces [SF], and related COIN forces. US SOF saw their first large-scale 
usage during the Vietnam conflict. Early during the war US SOF were mainly used in advisory 
roles to guide the anti-communist South Vietnamese forces. Later, as America stepped up its 
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involvement, SOF took a greater offensive role leading indigenous forces in special 
reconnaissance [SR] and direct action [DA] missions. The overall concept was to expend a small 
amount of US resources, such as a twelve man SF Operational Detachment Alpha [ODA] team 
to train and enable a larger indigenous force. SF assistance allowed operations to occur by, 
through, and with indigenous forces, which limited US expenditures in resources and personnel.  
 Special Operations Forces [SOF] have remained a close-knit group of the US military 
that maintain a high level of operational secrecy. The label “SOF” is a broad term and is often 
confused with “Special Forces,” which are actually part of the US Army’s SOF component. 
USSOCOM is made up of approximately 55,900 personnel from the Army, Air Force, Navy, and 
Marine Corps1 (USSOCOM Fact Book, 2010). USSOCOM is a functional command which is 
tasked with the training, equipping, and providing SOF to the GCCs in support of GCC 
operations. What sets the SOF apart from the conventional or general purpose forces [GPF], are 
their abilities to solve problems through unconventional means. Ultimately, conventional forces 
simply cannot implement the same strategies or solutions offered by SOF (Machon & Kingston, 
2011).  
Some core SOF mission areas include unconventional warfare, direct action, 
counterterrorism, strategic reconnaissance, psychological operations, civil affairs, and foreign 
internal defense. The SOF’s unconventional nature has been a divisive force between them and 
the conventional GPF. The historical relationship between the SOF and GPF was often 
distrustful and strained (Marquis, 1997, p. 141). The SOF’s fixation on operational secrecy has 
continued to create distance between themselves and the modern military leadership. Due to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In 2006, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld ordered a Marine Corps Marine Special Operations Command 
[MARSOC], be activated and commanded by US Special Operations Command. 	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detached relationship, GPF commanders have failed to realize the potential of SOF capabilities 
in full spectrum operations (Machon & Kingston, 2011).  
 US SOF have played a major role in unconventional warfare operations in Afghanistan. 
US and coalition SOF formed a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force [CJSOTF]. The 
CJSOTF makes up what are called the “white SOF” or acknowledged US forces that are 
commanded by GPF headquarters. The white SOF operate out of bases located near local 
villages. Unlike JSOC, white SOF fall under the command of ISAF and USCENTCOM 
commanders. 
Within USSOCOM, there is a sub-unified command of approximately 4,000 SOF 
members and civilians comprising the Joint Special Operations Command [JSOC]. JSOC 
oversees the SOF special mission units often referred to as “black SOF,” or the unacknowledged 
US SOF (Ambinder, 2011). JSOC was formed in 1980 in the aftermath of the failed Iran hostage 
rescue in order to better coordinate multi-service special operations. JSOC adopted the role of a 
highly skilled CT and hostage rescue unit necessary in quick reaction operations (Marquis, 1997, 
pp. 63-64, 98). Included in this tier of SOF, are the US Army’s Special Forces Operational 
Detachment Delta or Delta Force, and the Navy’s SEAL Team 6 (Naylor S. D., Spec ops raids 
into Pakistan halted, 2008).  
JSOC’s role in the GWOT has included assembling highly classified task forces pursuing 
objectives related to an aggressive CT national security policy. JSOC’s shadowy participation in 
the GWOT is due to operational secrecy and the need to constantly pursue new intelligence. 
JSOC’s mission has included hunting down, then killing or capturing many high value targets 
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[HVT] in al Qaeda and the Taliban around Afghanistan and even into Western Pakistan (Scahill, 
2010).  
There are two types of operations that SOF has engaged in during the GWOT, 
clandestine, and covert operations. The 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act stated that in order 
for covert operations to be conducted, a Presidential finding must be prepared. The Presidential 
finding must lay out the specifics of the mission and the relevance to national strategic or 
security objectives (Kibbe, 2004, p. 105). JSOC operations are normally run exclusive from 
other military operations under the direction of the NCAs.  
 
3.3 Department of Defense Reform 
The conventional US military has historically remained highly skeptical of anything 
referred to as “elite” within its organization, especially the SOF. Mutual distrust and contempt 
has been evident between the two groups. Beginning in the late 1970s however, the US became 
involved in a series of crisis situations requiring decisive military action and coordination. Each 
of these operations suffered varying degrees of failure. In 1979 the Islamic revolution in Iran 
resulted in several Americans at the US embassy being taken hostage. The decision was made to 
attempt an SOF led special operation, to rescue the hostages.  
The US assembled members from the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines to support 
the SOF led rescue operation called “Eagle Claw.” Six months later the order was given to 
execute the operation. When two of the extraction helicopters experienced mechanical failures 
the mission was aborted. When one of the remaining helicopters attempted to depart the Iranian 
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desert, the pilot became disoriented and crashed into an Air Force C-130 fuel tanker which 
exploded. The operation resulted in eight US service members killed (Cogan, 2003, p. 214). 
A special operations review group later noted several issues with the operation, which 
raised questions about the ability to conduct multi-service special operations. The review cited 
poorly defined command and control relationships as well as a lack of coordination among the 
services. The review also pointed out that a comprehensive training exercise would have 
uncovered several problems that surfaced later in the actual operation (Ibid.). This failed 
operation, known as “Desert One,” became a catalyst in the debate for DOD reformation. 
Another such incident occurred during the 1983 invasion of the Caribbean island of 
Grenada. The ruling government in Grenada had been overthrown by Marxists in a military 
coup. Ongoing fighting between the Marxists and pro-government supporters created concern for 
the safety of 600 American students at a Grenadine medical school (Cole, 1998-1999, p. 57). The 
initial US plans involved extracting US citizens at risk in the country, but as support for ousting 
the Marxists grew among Caribbean leaders, the plans shifted to a large scale invasion. The US 
was soon planning its largest military operation since Vietnam (Marquis, 1997, p. 94). The 
operation included several units from the Navy SEALs, Army Delta Force, and Army Rangers.  
In this case, time delays gave up the element of surprise and instead of landing under the 
cover of night, SOF troops landed at daylight, after the main invasion had begun (Marquis, 1997, 
p. 98). The Inter-service communication problems also became obvious. Difficulties began when 
US Army Rangers came under fire and were unable to call for naval fire support. This 
communication problem was due initially to the Rangers not knowing the proper procedure for 
requesting Naval strikes. Nevertheless, a lack of training to request naval support became a non-
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issue, due to the Ranger’s radios being incompatible with naval communications systems 
(Marquis, 1997, p. 101). In the end, unofficial reports of the incident in Grenada resulted in an 
estimated nineteen killed, and one hundred fifty-two wounded. While the primary objectives of 
the operation in Grenada were met, later accounts would critically describe the misuse of SOF in 
seizing unnecessary objectives and resulting in several deaths (Marquis, 1997, pp. 105-106). 
One author later attributed these military failures to three common denominators 
including poor military advice to political leaders, a lack of unity of command, and the inability 
for the military to operate jointly. Further investigation concluded that there was “no capable 
joint organization to execute these missions,” (Locher III, 2001, p. 100). The view from 
Congress was that joint air, ground, and naval operations were crucial in order to successfully 
capitalize on the capabilities of the US military. The failed special operations and a surge in 
international terrorist activity outlined clearly the inter-service deficiencies that existed 
throughout the military. Realizing that the US lacked the critical capabilities needed to address 
modern threats, members of the military and Congress began to call for reformation at the DOD. 
The Pentagon however, vehemently rejected all calls for reform, and fought to keep 
Congressional interference limited.  
A Senate Armed Services Committee investigation found that disproportional powers 
were held by the individual services and were limiting the attention to “Joint Force” 
coordination. It appeared to Congress that the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines were too 
preoccupied with their individual roles to weigh measures necessary for mission success. In 1986 
Congress finally passed the Department of Defense Reformation Act, also called the Goldwater-
Nichols Act after its Senate sponsors. This new law unified the US military services under a 
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Joint Forces doctrine. Joint Forces doctrine refocused multi-service assets and combined their 
strengths under a single unified commander.  
Over time the globe had been divided up geographically into areas of responsibility 
[AOR] with military assets based in each region. There are currently six geographic combatant 
commanders [GCCs], including US Africa Command [USAFRICOM], US Central Command 
[USCENTCOM], US Northern Command [USNORTHCOM], US Pacific Command 
[USPACOM], and US Southern Command [USSOUTHCOM] (DefenseLINK.gov, 2004). Prior 
to Goldwater-Nichols, the GCCs had been weak and could not request or control other services 
assets within his AOR.  
Goldwater-Nichols broadened the authority of the unified GCCs2. The new authorities 
allowed GCCs to assemble and package “Joint Task Force” [JTF] to deal with battlefield 
conditions and resources (Locher III, 2001, p. 108). Empowering the GCC collapsed a 
previously complex chain of command between the policy makers and the battlefield. The GCC 
was now placed directly under the President and Secretary of Defense (Locher III, 1996, p. 12). 
The GCC was also in a better position to control his battle-space and all the military assets 
employed in any campaign. The act spelled out the services’ updated duties as “fully supportive” 
of the unified GCCs under the Joint Forces concept (Locher III, 2001, p. 108). The new Joint 
Forces reformation was changing the conventional military forces, but it had not addressed 
anything related to SOF. Original DOD reformers familiar with the SOF capabilities felt that 
Goldwater-Nichols needed SOF specifications, and pushed for further restructuring.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld changed the title of the “commanders in chief” to combatant 
commanders, due to his idea that the “Commander in Chief” title belonged solely to the President.	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3.4 Special Operations Forces Reform 
During the drafting of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, additional legislation was sought to 
ensure specific reformation of the US SOF. Defense reformation leading up to Goldwater-
Nichols, originated with solving problems with coordination of special operations. Yet, the 
legislation did not address anything that related to how special operations were planned, 
coordinated, or executed. Many advocates for SOF reform claimed that the US remained 
unprepared to fight the most likely wars it could face in the present or future (Marquis, 1997, p. 
126). Furthermore, it was believed that the conventional military would never understand or 
implement the full capabilities offered by SOF. 
The exact reasons for leaving SOF-specific measures out of the original legislation of 
1986 remain unclear. Some believed that not including specific SOF reform in Goldwater-
Nichols was due to the idea that SOF were already “inherently Joint” within the services (Ibid.). 
One “SOF Truth,” that supports the inherently joint concept states that “Most Special Operations 
require non-SOF support,” a fact that has remained true for all special operations. (USSOCOM 
Fact Book, 2010). Without specifics in Goldwater-Nichols, however, SOF could act as a distinct 
group outside the new “Joint” doctrine (Martin, 2009, p. 7). Others observed that the climate 
within the already reluctant DOD was simply not conducive to include any SOF reformation at 
that time. Neverthesless, Goldwater-Nichols was signed without any SOF reforms, although this 
fact was not lost on many familiar with the struggle to manage US special operations 
capabilities.  
SOF reformists agreed that in order to effectively improve SOF capabilities, a separate 
special operations organization would need to exist outside the conventional military (Marquis, 
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1997, p. 122). Senators Sam Nunn and William Cohen initiated SOF reformation by calling for a 
separate civilian agency to control SOF. Some argued for a separate defense agency run by a 
civilian would be too similar to the Central Intelligence Agency. Others believed that SOF 
should remain under military command as a distinct “sixth service,” (Marquis, 1997, p. 122). 
The argument to implement SOF as a “sixth service” was based on the conventional 
military’s inability to understand and implement SOF in the past. It was believed that as long as 
SOF were controlled by military leaders entrenched in conventional war fighting concepts; their 
capabilities would suffer (Ibid.). It was thought that without control over their own organization 
and budget, SOF would never gain the footing necessary to meet the developing security 
challenges. Arguments were made by members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
supporting establishment of a Joint Special Operations Agency [JSOA] which would be run by a 
civilian (Marquis, 1997, p. 85). The agency was established in 1984 with the intention that it 
could improve understanding of and planning for special operations. The JSOA was led by a 
two-star general (a three-star general was requested) that was under the Joint Staff’s Directorate 
of Operations (Marquis, 1997, p. 86). It was later clear that the JSOA was not having the desired 
effect and still lacked authority to direct special operations. The JSOA remained impeded and 
controlled by higher military leaders.  
Amendments to Goldwater-Nichols were undertaken and sponsored by Senators Sam 
Nunn and William Cohen. These amendments specifically targeted SOF shortfalls and were 
referred to as the Nunn-Cohen amendment [Nunn-Cohen]. Nunn-Cohen contained three 
elements that permanently changed the SOF standing within the military. First, Nunn-Cohen 
created a separate unified command US Special Operations Command [USSOCOM]. 
USSOCOM was given a “four star” commander to establish parity with the other combatant 
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commanders. It also established the position of assistant secretary of defense in charge of special 
operations and low-intensity conflict. Next, for the first time in law, it prescribed the elements of 
“special operations”. These included:  
“Direct action, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal 
defense, civil affairs, psychological operations, counterterrorism, humanitarian 
assistance, theater search and rescue, and such other activities as may be specified by the 
President or the Secretary of Defense.” (Marquis, 1997, p. 146) 
 
Finally, the amendments provided USSOCOM with its own resources and budget through 
major force program 11. The ability for USSOCOM to retain control over its resources and 
acquisitions was considered crucial for its effectiveness, and removed it from the fight for DOD 
funding. However, coming up as a new peer beside the other combatant commands did little to 
ease tensions or establish trust between the SOF and the GPF forces. 
 
3.5 Civil-Military Relations 
Along with reforming how the military services coordinated with each other, Goldwater-
Nichols established new civil-military relationships. First, the legislation acknowledged that the 
Secretary of Defense exercised ultimate control over the military. Power was taken away from 
the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], and placed in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
[CJCS]. The CJCS was able to assemble and confer with the Joint Staff for advice, but final 
advice given to the White House came from the CJCS. Some argue that shifting power away 
from the corporate style JCS to a single military advisor has had negative consequences.  
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One former US military officer, Major Christopher Bourne, writes that Goldwater-
Nichols has actually decreased civilian control over the military. Bourne begins by pointing out 
that the US President’s duties “demand a range of alternatives when confronted with matters of 
national security.” Therefore according to Bourne, the President’s duty to receive a wide range of 
military advice was damaged when the CJCS became the sole military advisor to the President 
(Bourne, 1998, p. 103). Bourne went on to write that this configuration also relegated the 
secretary of defense to formulating only general defense policy, while more important national 
security decisions went to the CJCS.  
The decision to place power in the CJCS instead of the corporate JCS was due to 
efficiency. Bourne goes on to describe that allotting power to the CJCS was an attempt at a “one 
man solution,” for military decisions (Bourne, 1998, p. 104). The decisions weighed before the 
Joint Staff often have had far reaching effects. Operational and tactical decisions are reached 
through the suppression of alternate actions, until a top commander approves a decision and acts. 
This method of decision making is useful for the battlefield but is unsuitable at higher levels. 
Bourne suggested that commanders can typically adjust and correct tactical and operational 
mistakes before they affect the outcome of a campaign. Strategic level errors such as force 
structure and national objectives on the other hand are typically “irreversible and often fatal,” 
(Ibid.). Because national policy and military plans intersect at the Joint Chiefs, decisions 
affecting strategic national objectives should receive a range of alternatives.  
While the President was still able to seek out military advice from the Joint Chiefs, 
voicing opinions contrary to the CJCS too often could be career ending. Pro-reformers on the 
other hand, believed that allowing the CJCS the last word was necessary due to the history of 
collective JCS advice being too ineffective. Prior to the reformation, advice coming from the JCS 
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was often debated and agreed upon when it reached the “lowest common denominator.” The 
results from this decision making process were watered down and often useless for formulating 
strategic solutions (Locher III, 2001, p. 103). 
Another point outlined by Bourne explained that under the new law, defense policy 
formulation saw the military with the upper hand when making strategic decisions. Bourne 
quoted former Secretary of Defense Les Aspen’s view of bureaucratic decision making at the 
Pentagon: “the side capable of making the best arguments will normally prevail,” (Ibid.). Bourne 
then reasserted that on military related matters, the Joint Staff would always produce better 
arguments than their civilian counterparts. In Bourne’s opinion, the shifting of power to the 
CJCS and his control over the JCS created an office far more effective at exerting influence over 
defense decisions than the civilian leaders.  
 
3.6 US Counterterrorism Policy Prior to September 11, 2001 
In the past, when the US has been challenged by unconventional terrorist threats, the 
President has engaged the SOF to respond to the problem. However the military leadership was 
often quick to develop the “better argument” against military involvement. The Joint Staff 
responded negatively to White House requests for SOF led operations against terrorists on 
several occasions during the Clinton administration. In 1998 the al Qaeda terrorist network 
attacked two US embassies in Africa. Later in 2000, al Qaeda also attacked a US Naval 
destroyer, the USS Cole. Options to utilize SOF against terrorist networks were proposed several 
times to respond to these threats during the Clinton administration. Despite al Qaeda’s public 
declarations of war on the US, the Joint Staff remained unwilling to respond with military force. 
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Former National Security Council advisor Richard Clarke described several proposals to employ 
SOF to attack or disrupt al Qaeda. Despite Clarke’s proposals being backed by President Clinton 
and top defense leaders, they were turned down by the Joint Chiefs at the Pentagon. Each time 
proposed SOF operations were approved by the White House and submitted to the military for 
review, they were rejected by the JCS.  
Reasons cited by the JCS included:  
− It would take a very large force; 
− The operation was risky, and might fail, with U.S. forces captured or killed, 
embarrassing the President; 
− Their “professional military opinion” was not to do it; 
− But, of course, they could do it if they received orders to do so in writing from the 
President of the United States; 
− And, by the way, military lawyers said it would be a violation of international law 
(Clarke, 2004, p. 145). 
 
The fact that “terrorism” had been defined by the US as a criminal matter, relegated 
terrorists to the criminal justice system (Schultz Jr., 2004, p. 26). According to former 
USSOCOM leader General Peter Schoomaker, defining terrorism as a crime kept military and 
SOF operations off the table. This reasoning by military leaders allowed them to assume that 
terrorism should be dealt with by the FBI or CIA instead of military assets. Due to these 
conclusions, military special operations were never pursued in response to terrorist threats before 
9/11 (Schultz Jr., 2004, p. 27). More recent actions taken against terrorists only continue to blur 
the line between legal and military policy in the ongoing struggle against terrorism. Two recent 
instances include the criminal prosecution of Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab, the would-be 
Christmas day suicide terrorist, and the recent drone strike that killed American born al Qaeda 
linked terrorist Anwar al Awlaki in Yemen. These two cases illustrate often difficult decision 
making faced by US leaders and military leaders involved in unconventional conflict.  
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3.7 Global War on Terrorism Planning in Afghanistan  
After the attacks on September 11th, 2001, President Bush went looking for options to 
confront al Qaeda’s terrorist network. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approached 
USCENTCOM, whose AOR included Afghanistan, to go over military plans. The 
USCENTCOM commander, General Tommy Franks had no plans ready for immediate action in 
Afghanistan (Woodward, 2002, p. 43). The CIA however offered a plan which was ready to 
begin immediate operations. The CIA plan was given the green light from the President, which 
upset Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.  
As the US focused on Afghanistan, more became known about al Qaeda and the threats it 
posed to US security. The unconventional nature of terror networks like al Qaeda led the US to 
base its strategy on unconventional warfare [UW] (USSOCOM, 2007, p. 15). The early phases of 
the GWOT in Afghanistan involved sending in CIA special activities division [SAD] 
paramilitaries and SOF teams to simultaneously overthrow the Taliban and destroy al Qaeda 
(Berntsen & Pezzullo, 2005, pp. 74-75). The nature of the GWOT in and of itself was unique, 
specifically its declaration of war on terror networks. The “criminal” obstacle that had prevented 
the military from fighting terrorism was out of the way now that the US had a declaration of war 
against terrorists.  
Covering events surrounding the GWOT, Seymour Hersh indicated that civil-military 
relations changed a great deal under the Bush administration. Hersh described Secretary 
Rumsfeld being adamant that terrorists had to be dealt with through unconventional means. 
Rumsfeld anticipated accomplishing this through clandestine military operations, which had 
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previously been left to the CIA (Hersh, Chain of Command, 2005, p. 272). In order to effectively 
pursue this strategy, it was necessary to advance changes in the military establishment, 
particularly at USSOCOM.  
USSOCOM had traditionally been responsible for training, equipping, and providing 
SOF to the unified commands. USSOCOM also maintained the JSOC units responsible for 
classified missions pursuant to national security as directed by the White House. During the early 
phases of the GWOT in 2002, USSOCOM leader General Charles Holland was reportedly 
reluctant to plan aggressive operations proposed by Secretary Rumsfeld (Hersh, Chain of 
Command, 2005, pp. 271-272). Hersh goes on to describe what the Rumsfeld team at the 
Pentagon called a “Clintonized” peacetime military leadership that did not understand how to 
fight an unconventional enemy. Hersh described more incidents of military resistance to 
Pentagon proposals of targeting al Qaeda leaders. Questions of legalities surfaced again with 
proposed special operations missions and what the military leaders considered a criminal 
problem. An interview with one of Secretary Rumsfeld’s advisers summed up Rumsfeld’s 
thoughts on military unwillingness to deal with terrorism: 
“I know you have been getting this from the Joint Staff… I’ve heard this—‘It’s not 
American’—from the military leadership. But it’s not because of legality. It’s because 
they don’t want to do it.” (Hersh, 2005, p. 271) 
 
To adjust the capabilities of the SOF, Rumsfeld expanded the authority of USSOCOM to 
act as a global command and facilitate global offensive operations on al Qaeda’s terror network. 
Rumsfeld asked the USSOCOM leadership to “lean forward” and aggressively approach the new 
fight the US was engaged in (Ibid.). From 2002 through 2005, USSOCOM developed plans 
towards becoming the lead command for planning and synchronizing the GWOT (USSOCOM, 
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2007, p. 15). It was surmised that USSOCOM would be appropriate to lead the counterterrorism 
efforts due to its inherently global area of responsibility [AOR]. Al Qaeda had conducted 
missions which cut across several of the geographic combatant commanders [GCC] AORs 
including US European Command, US Central Command, and US Pacific Command. It was 
determined that a combatant command with global reach would best be suited to take charge of 
the campaign (Ibid.).  
The 2004 unified command plan [UCP] granted USSOCOM greater roles and authority 
and put it in charge of synchronizing global CT strategy. This plan allowed USSOCOM to 
develop CT operations for the other GCCs and was immediately unpopular. The eight GCCs put 
together an alternate arrangement giving USSOCOM only coordinating abilities. Commander of 
USSOCOM General Doug Brown however asked vice CJCS General Peter Pace to forward both 
plans and allow Rumsfeld to decide which to use. In the end, the 2004 UCP signed by President 
Bush, directed USSOCOM to serve 
“As the lead combatant commander for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, 
executing global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other 
combatant commanders” (USSOCOM, 2007, p. 16) 
 
The 2007 edition of USSOCOM History details the development of the GWOT campaign and 
outlines the command’s new roles and authorities given to the USSOCOM Command. 
USSOCOM’s authority was now able to side-step responsibilities held by the unified GCCs 
(Ibid.) and outlined in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The 2004 UCP also included two references 
outlining how the USSOCOM Commander would be the supported commander when directed 
for “operations in support of selected campaigns,” and for “selected special operations missions,” 
(Ibid.).  
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JSOC does not require coordination with regional battle-space owners for their operations 
(see Appendix I, Figure. 4). This has led to various complications on the side of US and ISAF 
forces in Afghanistan pursuing long-term COIN efforts (Machon & Kingston, 2011). One 
example of the difficulty experienced with JSOC operations was elaborated in an interview with 
a veteran Army Special Forces senior non-commissioned officer. Sergeant Major Bradley 
Kingston explained how JSOC often restricted an entire battle space and diverted all support 
assets to their specific mission. In some cases this involved redirecting critical close air support 
from coalition forces while under fire, to support a JSOC operation elsewhere. In the end, JSOC 
operations have frustrated many troops taking part in COIN operations (Machon & Kingston, 
2011).  
Nevertheless, the successes of JSOC operations have come into question, due to several 
negative consequences. The covert nature of JSOC operations has prevented them from 
coordinating with US and ISAF forces who are trying to build trust with the population. The CT 
operations have also stoked anti-Afghan government sentiments among the Afghan population. 
The negativity associated with JSOC CT raids has generated several questions regarding the US 
COIN-CT strategy. Interviews with one veteran Army Special Forces operator with extensive 
GWOT experience in both Afghanistan and Iraq revealed some of the difficulties presented by 
JSOC CT operations. Army Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel Harrison Gilliam commanded a 
Special Operations Task Force in Regional Command East and Regional Command North in 
Afghanistan during 2009. LTC. Gilliam stated that JSOC operations were un-nested and 
unsynchronized with operations conducted by the Regional Command battle space owners 
(Gilliam, 2011).  
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The ability for JSOC to conduct operations on its own with little to no coordination poses 
serious risks for the other forces operating in the area. The fact that these operations conflict 
greatly with well established joint doctrine found in Goldwater-Nichols further presents 
questions regarding ongoing support for these covert operations. The fact that JSOC will likely 
continue to operate unimpeded across the battle space should trouble those responsible for 
coordinating COIN operations there. According to LTC. Gilliam, the Regional Commanders’ 
view of JSOC has been extended to “paint all SOF with the same brush and further the mistrust.” 
(Gilliam, 2011). The battle space owners’ mistrust has ultimately generated difficulty for many 
SOF to coordinate operations with the adjacent commanders.  
 
3.8 Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Implementation 
Several strategic scholars continue to debate which strategy the US should proceed with 
and why. Obviously, this debate revolves around the two primary strategies discussed throughout 
this thesis, COIN and CT. Generally speaking, those in favor of COIN offer various 
modifications to the current COIN operation, while the CT focused group support a scaled back 
US-ISAF force with a narrower set of goals. The broader goal behind the COIN operation is 
creating a stable country which can support its own prolonged security. A stable and secure 
Afghanistan would ideally prevent terrorist networks from re-establishing themselves and 
threatening further transnational violence. Many have been pessimistic about the military’s 
previous efforts at COIN operations for several reasons. Primarily, maintaining minimal troop 
numbers to support COIN operations has been frequently cited as a key problem.  
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During President Bush’s two terms in office, his “light footprint” approach allowed a 
previously weakened Taliban to regroup with violent consequences (O'Hanlon & Riedel, 2011, 
p. 127). By 2009 the war in Iraq had a reduction in violence and improved stability which 
allowed US attention to return to Afghanistan. While reviewing the situation in Afghanistan, 
President Obama appointed Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal as commander of US and 
ISAF forces. President Obama asked LTG. McChrystal for a candid assessment of the situation 
in Afghanistan. LTG. McChrystal had recently commanded JSOC during the Iraq war and had 
shown considerable success in dismantling al Qaeda there, including killing its leader Abu 
Musab al Zarqawi. LTG. McChrystal later stated that a COIN strategy could succeed, but needed 
additional troops. Assessments given to President Obama by McChrystal ranged in numbers 
from a minimum 20,000 to an “unrealistic” 85,000 (Woodward, 2010, p. 273).  
In an October 2009 speech, LTG. McChrystal stated that “the key to strategy is aligning 
resources with goals,” (Long, 2010, p. 200). These and other public remarks left President 
Obama in a precarious political situation with the war. President Obama eventually approved a 
final surge of 30,000 American forces to conduct LTG. McChrystal’s reinvigorated COIN 
strategy. This surge in troops brought the total troop numbers in Afghanistan to 270,000 or 
170,000 Afghans, 64,000 Americans, and 35,000 NATO/ISAF troops (Boot, 2009, p. 5). Even 
with these new totals, it was still grossly disproportionate to what was needed in COIN doctrine 
or, one troop per fifty civilians. With 30 million Afghans, the COIN strategy would need closer 
to 600,000 total troops to theoretically pursue the goals (Ibid.). Notwithstanding the previous 
light footprint’s failure at COIN, the Obama administration did little to adjust conditions. 
Even so, many US military leaders continue to suggest that COIN operations can 
succeed. One military figure key to the strategy in Afghanistan is the commander of USSOCOM, 
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Admiral Erik Olsen. During a conference in May 2010, ADM. Olsen stated that 
“counterinsurgency should involve countering the insurgents,” and “[He] fears 
counterinsurgency had become a euphemism for non-kinetic operations.” (Bennett, 2010). 
Despite never providing adequate troop levels, President Obama has already said that he will 
begin withdrawing troops in 2011, and will have withdrawn 33,000 by 2012 (President Obama 
Speech, 2011). These numbers account for nearly all of the 40,000 troops provided for the troop 
surge from 2009. Due to the US not providing the necessary means to pursue a COIN strategy, it 
appears that the military adapted and developed a strategy based on the resources available and a 
loose definition of COIN. 
In many reports, US military leaders have never been clear when describing frequently 
used terms like “irregular warfare” and COIN operations. Michael Boyle, in Foreign Affairs, 
outlined the conflation of COIN and CT doctrines that has become part of US strategy in 
Afghanistan (Boyle, 2010, p. 343). Boyle determined that in cases such as Afghanistan where CT 
and COIN are waged simultaneously, certain elements of each can be mutually reinforcing. 
Boyle also maintained however, that these benefits were outweighed by each strategy 
undermining the other, resulting in a stalemate. Boyle explained how both strategies rely on a 
calculated cost-benefit analysis. Boyle notes that kinetic CT operations are able to disrupt the 
Taliban and al Qaeda operatives; however they come at the cost of driving the population against 
US, ISAF, and Afghan national forces. Boyle is quick to note that there is measureable success 
through the covert CT programs. Yet when these operations inflicted civilian casualties, public 
anger towards coalition forces and Afghan government grew (Boyle, 2010, p. 346). Kinetic 
operations are not the only dividing force between insurgents and US-ISAF forces. The 
underlying fact that the Karzai government remains rife with corruption and weak in the outer 
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regions of Afghanistan creates difficulty in winning over locals to the central government. The 
fraudulent elections in 2010 left the US-ISAF coalition with no legitimate national partner 
(Boyle, 2010, p. 350). This is yet another force seriously undermining COIN operations that 
Boyle describes below: 
“The ironic result of using democratic elections as a means to produce legitimacy is that 
the US, in its counterinsurgency effort, is now chained to a less cooperative government 
that actually validates Al-Qaeda’s narrative.” (Boyle, 2010, p. 351) 
The ongoing corruption is yet another peripheral reality that must be weighed as the US plans its 
drawdown from the conflict. 
Next, CT focused operations have been labeled by some as “oxymoronic” because they 
require ongoing intelligence collection, which can only be gained by access to the population 
(O'Hanlon & Riedel, 2011, p. 127). However what is overlooked in this statement is the fact that 
strikes into Pakistan and Yemen have succeeded against terrorist targets with no access to the 
population, and no US troops on the ground (Long, 2010, p. 211). The most recent example of 
this would be the Navy SEAL raid on Osama bin Laden in May of this year. Another concern is 
the inability of COIN operations to address the problems in Pakistan. COIN operations in 
Afghanistan can’t deal with problems posed by militant groups in Pakistan. Organizations 
including al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and the Haqqani network reside across the border in 
western Pakistan and threaten Afghanistan’s long-term stability. As the US has demonstrated 
through its increased drone strikes into denied Pakistani territory, CT remains nearly the only 
option to address these threats.  
 Interestingly, during LTG. McChrystal’s command in Afghanistan, the campaign 
showed an escalation of CT operations (Woodward, 2010, p. 355). LTG. McChrystal had limited 
the CT raids conducted by GPF and white SOF and gave the bulk of these operations to JSOC. 
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JSOC’s increased CT raids against high value targets [HVT] in al Qaeda and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan were having marked success. In “Obama’s Wars,” Bob Woodward referred to some 
intelligence gathered on the Taliban and al Qaeda who had retreated into Pakistan. These bits of 
enemy intelligence chatter led US leaders to believe that the enemy leadership was afraid to 
return to Afghanistan with the increased use of JSOC hunter-killer teams (Woodward, 2010, p. 
356). Thus the US is again in a position similar to that prior to the GWOT; having al Qaeda and 
its affiliates operating from a relatively safe haven to plan attacks from. 
 One observation that can be agreed upon by those discussing Afghanistan is the necessity 
of building Afghan security forces. The Afghan police, security forces, and national Army forces 
must one day take over protecting their villages, districts, and cities. It is the opinion of this 
author that given a more focused set of goals, forces that were part of the COIN effort could 
redirect attention to training and forming the Afghan security force. Whichever strategy the US 
decides to pursue in Afghanistan, eventually security ultimately must come from the Afghans 
themselves. Many aspects of the campaign in Afghanistan will remain difficult in the coming 
years. It is important however for US forces to confront the strategic realities of the campaign to 
the best of their ability, with the resources they have.  
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Section 4. 
4.1 Conclusions 
To summarize, the US COIN strategy in Afghanistan has clearly suffered several 
setbacks and if continued in its present form will likely fail to stabilize Afghanistan. First, the 
GWOT was planned with CT centric operations in mind. Second, after a strategic shift to 
stability and security operations (COIN) was announced, joint coordination was lost between 
forces pursuing CT and those pursuing COIN operations. Next, adequate means were never put 
into place to succeed with the COIN operation. Finally, COIN operations can do little to address 
the terrorist entities that have dispersed into Pakistan. Even if COIN operations succeeded in 
Afghanistan, it is likely that after western forces withdrew, terrorist elements from Pakistan 
would return and reestablish themselves.  
Now in its tenth year of the conflict, America is growing tired of supporting an expensive 
and unpopular conflict. Issues such as the US economy and jobs have drawn the attention of US 
leaders away from Afghanistan. Conditions for continuing a COIN strategy have become 
increasingly difficult. Widespread corruption and the rigged 2009 elections within the Karzai 
government have further complicated the US-ISAF mission. With the drawdown of military 
forces in Afghanistan imminent, it is imperative that US leaders focus on what is achievable with 
the means available. Lacking the means to conduct real COIN operations, the focus should return 
to CT operations. An active CT driven strategy would make the most of US resources in theater 
and could create an environment which may even lead to negotiations ending the conflict. CT 
focused operations would further allow for the imminent decrease in US troops and lower the 
ongoing costs of military expenditure.  
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Kinetic CT operations and drone strikes will continue to be necessary in Afghanistan and 
at times, in Pakistan. Because Pakistan will play a considerable role in Afghanistan’s long term 
stability, the US must maintain pressure on them. Pakistan’s stated desires to remain an active 
partner of the US in ongoing CT operations must persist. Pakistan’s responsibility in 
Afghanistan’s stability must be made clear with the implication of altering future US support. 
For better or for worse, US and Pakistani leaders have similar interests in building and promoting 
a stable Afghanistan. 
It must be noted that any option pursued by US leaders in Afghanistan will include risks 
to Afghanistan’s long term stability. Presently, there is no optimal solution that can be reconciled 
with the facts on the ground. Perhaps the greatest drawback to a strategy focused solely on CT 
operations, involves a perpetuated cycle of finding and killing the next terrorist or target. The 
nature of a perpetuated war on terrorism is such that it will remain difficult to determine any 
clear point of victory or finality. There is however, one level of success which can be clearly 
measured. The buildup of Afghan police and military forces can be a clear indication for 
advancement towards a conclusion of the conflict. A CT strategy would allow a larger US effort 
to develop competent Afghan security forces. It is an imminent fact for all involved that the 
Afghan security forces will someday be responsible for stability in the Afghan state. 
Unfortunately there are no guarantees or optimal solutions to the problems with the conflict in 
Afghanistan. Isolating and reducing support for Islamic extremism can take generations to 
achieve. Ultimately, the realities facing American efforts in Afghanistan present the CT strategy 
as the best match with available resources for the conflict. 
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4.2 Further Study 
An important issue related to this research deals with the relationships and coalitions 
formed in the global fight against terrorism. The first is the relationship forged clandestinely 
between the CIA and US SOF units conducting CT operations. In the course of this research it 
was discovered that there is little command and control doctrine relating to the relationship 
between CIA and military groups. Title 50 of the US Code specifies that the CIA is responsible 
for undertaking covert operations similar to what has transpired in Afghanistan. The GWOT has 
often blurred the lines between whether civilian or military assets should be used against 
terrorism. One example has been the CIA’s extensive use of armed unmanned aerial vehicles 
[UAV] or drones to target specific individuals. The civil-military command and control 
relationship in the GWOT would be worth investigating further. 
Another relationship that has generated difficulty in Afghanistan is the ISAF partnership. 
It has become clear that nearly all policies relying on military operations have attempted to first 
establish a multi-national coalition. With the support of a multi-national coalition came several 
problems. Many ISAF partners entered the theater of war with caveats and obtuse rules of 
engagement. NATO and the UN have primarily engaged in a limited capacity in the past when 
crisis or wars broke out. However, campaigns in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and most 
recently Libya have all seen the efforts of several powerful states engaging in “international joint 
warfare.” Despite ISAF having a supreme commander, each coalition member continues to 
dictate the caveats from which their forces will operate under and for how long. The varying 
degree of participation has created several problems for commanders in the field. Concerning the 
operational relationship between US forces and ISAF, the Goldwater-Nichols legislation affects 
only the actions of US forces and offers nothing relating to operating with international coalition 
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partners. And likewise, the US has wanted and received operational control [OPCON] over all 
SOF task forces in Afghanistan. Keeping all SOF under US command was most likely done in 
order to avoid any restrictions of operation in the event that a rapid reaction became necessary, 
such as the raid targeting Osama bin Laden in May this year.   
Several incidents in the GWOT have illustrated the difficulty in employing coalition 
troops when each operates under different caveats. One such incident arose when German SOF 
were targeting a Taliban leader. The German SOF collected enough intelligence to launch a 
mission to capture the individual. When the raid occurred, the Taliban were alerted and because 
the German rules of engagement did not permit them to engage the enemy, the target was 
allowed to flee (Koelbl & Szandar, 2008). The diverse restrictions placed upon ISAF members 
have continued to obfuscate a truly unified effort throughout the coalition. Similar problems have 
surfaced between US SOF and other coalition members operating near one another commander’s 
battle space. US CT raids upset one British commander whose COIN operations were 
supposedly disrupted by the US actions. The UK commander finally asked that the US leave the 
AO (Walsh & Norton-Taylor, 2007). Further study should be undertaken to better understand the 
intricacies of this model of “international joint warfare” and the associated difficulties of 
coalitions in modern conflict. 
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Appendix A. 
 
 
Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan showing ISAF Regional Commands and major units as of June 
2011 (Source: www.isaf.nato.int). 
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Figure 2. United States – NATO (ISAF) command structure as of March 31, 2011 (Source: 
www.globalsecurity.org). 
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Figure 3. US-ISAF Special Operations Forces Command Structure 2010 (Created with reference 
to Naylor, S. D. 2009). 
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Appendix B. 
 
 
Interview conducted by the author and LTC. Matthew Machon, US Army SF, and SGM Bradley 
Kingston, US Army SF, at Camp Williams US Army National Guard, Draper UT on March 2, 
2011. 
 
 
1. What are some examples of OPCON and TACON situations that have created problems 
for SOF in Afghanistan? 
2. What are the key differences between JSOC and USSOCOM?  
3. Who exercised more control over operations in Afghanistan? 
4. How has the various command structures evolved in Afghanistan?  
5. What is the nature of the ISAF-CENTCOM relationship?  
6. Who has ultimate command authority in Afghanistan?  
7. In 2003, ISAF was stood up and has since taken over control of more areas in 
Afghanistan, how has the relationship between ISAF-CENTCOM changed over the last 
10 years? 
8. Has the use of US NCA’s use of nationally strategic level (JSOC) SOF impacted the 
missions of ISAF, USCENTCOM, and/or other SOF in Afghanistan?  
9. What are the key command and control challenges facing SOF in Afghanistan that you 
have experienced? 
10. What could improve these C2 challenges? 
11. What does an optimal C2 structure look like in Afghanistan? 
12. What does an optimal strategy in Afghanistan look like? 
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Interview questions conducted with LTC. Harrison Gilliam, US Army SF, via email 
correspondence during March 2011. 
 
 
1. What is your military background, command experience, number of deployments to 
Afghanistan and/or Iraq with dates, current command status? 
2. What was the C2 structure over SOF forces in Afghanistan from 2009, or while you were 
there?   
3. How has JSOC led operations impacted conventional and “white-SOF” missions in 
Afghanistan? 
4. Has JSOC operations undermined the efforts by the other SOF forces in Afghanistan? 
5. Is there still a need for JSOC to do these raid missions, or could (white) SOF already 
deployed in Afghanistan cover the job?  
6. In your opinion, why is JSOC still being used for these raids and strikes? 
7. If JSOC continues its presence and missions in Afghanistan, what would the optimal 
relationship be between JSOC and the other forces deployed in theater? 
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